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Abstract— NASA’s Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic 
Management (UTM) project aims at enabling near-term, safe 
operations of small UAS vehicles in uncontrolled airspace, i.e., 
Class G airspace.  A far-term goal of UTM research and 
development is to accommodate the expected rise in small UAS 
traffic density throughout the National Airspace System (NAS) at 
low altitudes for beyond visual line-of-sight operations. This 
paper describes a new capability referred to as ICAROUS 
(Integrated Configurable Algorithms for Reliable Operations of 
Unmanned Systems), which is being developed under the UTM 
project. ICAROUS is a software architecture comprised of highly 
assured algorithms for building safety-centric, autonomous, 
unmanned aircraft applications. Central to the development of 
the ICAROUS algorithms is the use of well-established formal 
methods to guarantee higher levels of safety assurance by 
monitoring and bounding the behavior of autonomous systems. 
The core autonomy-enabling capabilities in ICAROUS include 
constraint conformance monitoring and contingency control 
functions. ICAROUS also provides a highly configurable user 
interface that enables the modular integration of mission-specific 
software components. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
NASA’s Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic 
Management (UTM) project is a research and development 
effort aimed at enabling increasing number of low-altitude, 
small UAS operations in uncontrolled airspace. The UTM 
project addresses multiple aspects of airspace operations and 
air traffic management. In particular, UTM research concerns 
the technologies and capabilities necessary to enable safe, 
routine, small-UAS (sUAS) operations for civilian and public 
applications such as delivery of goods, infrastructure 
monitoring, precision agriculture, and search and rescue. One 
key objective of the UTM project is ensuring that the safety of 
existing users of the airspace is preserved. To ensure the 
desired target level of safety, while at the same time enabling 
efficient, extended, and increasingly more autonomous 
operations, small UAS will have to be equipped with a 
minimum set of core capabilities to satisfy the mission goals as 
well as safety and UTM constraints.   
The UTM Concept of Operations [1] envisages UAS that 
will use “onboard detect and avoid systems to avoid other 
traffic, adverse weather, terrain, and man-made and natural 
obstacles.” UTM incremental development process comprises 
a series of builds of increasing complexity and user services. In 
the initial stages, UTM ensures the safety of UAS operations 
with a combination of limited airborne technology, procedural 
segregation from other potential users of the airspace, and 
limited user services. Later builds assume increasing levels of 
operational autonomy assisted by airborne technologies of 
increasing complexity and reliability.  The Integrated 
Configurable Algorithms for Reliable Operations of Unmanned 
Systems software architecture (ICAROUS), being developed 
as part of the UTM project, will provide highly assured core 
software modules for building safety-centric autonomous 
unmanned aircraft applications.  ICAROUS follows a long 
history of implementations of formally verified algorithms for 
safety-critical air traffic applications [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. These 
implementations continue to evolve with new modules and 
algorithms to address newer challenges and problems in air 
traffic systems. A recent implementation known as 
DAIDALUS (Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned 
Systems) [7], which is the basis for the ICAROUS software 
architecture, is included as the reference implementation of 
RTCA-228 MOPS (Appendix G) for UAS DAA (Detect and 
Avoid). DAIDALUS consists of self-separation and alerting 
algorithms that provide situational awareness to UAS remote 
pilots in the form of maneuver guidance intended to aid in 
maintaining or regaining “well clear” separation for large 
unmanned vehicles. The safety-critical software components of 
ICAROUS follow a well-established formal development 
process. These include the formal specification and verification 
of the functional requirements and algorithms using the 
Prototype Verification System (PVS) [8] and rigorous software 
validation using methods such as model animation [9]. The 
design and development of highly assured software for safety 
critical applications is made possible by this rigorous process.  
ICAROUS provides a mission agnostic and highly 
configurable API (Application Program Interface) to enable its 
integration to diverse mission applications and platforms. The 
software development will be made available under NASA’s 
Open Source Agreement.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170001936 2019-08-31T17:38:04+00:00Z
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides a brief description of the concept of use and 
high-level system architecture for ICAROUS-enabled 
autonomous operations in the UTM system. Section 3 
introduces ICAROUS architecture and main functionality, 
Section 4 describes the safety-focused formal algorithm design 
and development approach used in ICAROUS, and Section 5 
provides a summary of ongoing and future work. 
II. AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS IN THE UTM SYSTEM 
The UTM system aims at providing operation approval, 
geofences/constraints, and  runtime flight monitoring to 
participating small, low altitude UAS operating in uncontrolled 
airspace. These vehicles, referred to as UTM Clients, are 
expected to communicate with UTM service providers, before 
and during operations, to ensure that the safety of the airspace 
and the non-flying public is preserved. 
Within the UTM framework, vehicles equipped with 
autonomy-enabling technology will be capable of executing 
extended, beyond line-of-sight missions in increasingly 
complex, dense airspace conditions, using “onboard detect and 
avoid systems to avoid other traffic, adverse weather, terrain, 
and man-made and natural obstacles” [1]. Autonomous UTM 
clients will also be expected to submit flight plans for approval, 
as well as request geofencing information and airspace 
constraints from the UTM server, both before and during flight. 
The onboard systems will be responsible for the safe execution 
of the mission ensuring that airspace constraints are satisfied at 
all times.  The onboard systems will be responsible for 
ensuring mission-safety by preventing violations of geofencing 
constraints and preserving the safety of other users of the 
airspace as well as the non-flying traffic. Fig. 1 depicts a multi-
layer safety hierarchy designed to support Autonomous UAS 
Operations.  
The safety hierarchy comprises multiple layers of 
complementary functionality designed to enable the integration 
of UAS missions of increasing autonomy for extended 
operations in non-segregated airspace. 
The ground-based UTM systems provide the strategic 
airspace management functions to approve and establish 
airspace boundaries for the requested missions.  On-board 
systems ensure compliance with the given airspace constraints 
and autonomously managing contingencies such as conflicts 
with other users of the airspace or stationary obstacles on the 
path of the flight. 
The onboard system shown in Fig. 1 includes two 
complementary capabilities: ICAROUS and SAFEGUARD 
[10]. While both modules are capable of operating stand-alone, 
this implementation proposes an integrated architecture in 
which ICAROUS performs dynamic constraint monitoring, 
Detect and Avoid (DAA), obstacle avoidance and autonomous 
mission support, communicating with the ground systems and 
onboard sensors. SAFEGUARD independently monitors 
conformance to airspace constraints, utilizing highly-assured 
data and criteria established prior to flight. During flight, 
SAFEGUARD provides proximity boundary warnings to 
ICAROUS and autonomously terminates flight when constraint 
criteria are about to be violated or if the vehicle is 
unresponsive. Both ICAROUS and SAFEGUARD perform 
complementary safety functions and both systems are based on 
highly-assured, formally verified algorithms.  
Fig. 1. Safety Layers for Autonomous UAS Operations 
III. ICAROUS FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
ICAROUS supports mission execution with autonomous, 
safety-based navigation and decision making while monitoring 
UTM procedures and mission-specific criteria. Its core 
functions, shown in Fig. 2, include monitoring, and controlling 
for potential violations to conformance criteria dynamically 
updated during flight, such as new or updated geofences, stand-
off distances, flight plan updates, and traffic surveillance data 
as well as resolving contingencies and supporting mission 
flight requirements.   
A central element of safety assurance for autonomy is the 
ability to detect and identify possible conflicts with other users 
of the airspace as well as stationary obstacles on the vehicle 
path, avoiding collisions and maintaining a safe distance from 
all possible threats. In addition, ICAROUS actively computes 
resolution and recovery maneuvers and safe, conflict-free 
return to mission routes. The following sections provide a brief 
description of ICAROUS core functionality. 
Detect and Avoid  
ICAROUS detect and avoid capabilities are built upon 
DAIDALUS, a NASA-developed software library that 
implements a DAA concept for the integration of UAS in the 
National Airspace System (NAS). DAIDALUS uses a 
parametric volume, referred to as the well-clear volume 
(WCV), such that aircraft pairs jointly occupying this volume 
are considered to be in a well-clear violation.  
DAIDALUS includes algorithms for predicting a potential 
well-clear violation within a given look-ahead time, assuming 
non-maneuvering trajectories as well as for determining the 
instantaneous well-clear status between a pair of aircraft. 
Furthermore, DAIDALUS implements algorithms for 
computing maneuver guidance, in the form of conflict bands, 
assuming a simple kinematic trajectory model for the ownship 
aircraft.  Conflict bands represent ranges of track, ground 
speed, vertical speed, and altitude maneuvers that are predicted 
to result in well-clear violation with one of more traffic aircraft 
within a given look-ahead time. When aircraft are not well 
clear, or when a well-clear violation is unavoidable, 
DAIDALUS computes well-clear recovery bands, which 
represent ranges of horizontal and vertical maneuvers that 
regain well-clear status within the minimum possible time, 
while minimizing collision risk.  
Fig. 2. ICAROUS Core Functions 
Finally, DAIDALUS implements an alerting algorithm that 
computes an alert level indicating the severity of a potential 
well-clear violation as indicated in the RTCA SC228 Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS), currently under 
development1. All these algorithms have been formally verified 
to be correct with respect to their functional requirements. The 
software implementations in Java and C++ have been 
rigorously validated against their formal models using a battery 
of stressing case scenarios. 
DAIDALUS algorithms will be extended to support 
autonomous operations of sUAS and adapted to the airspace 
and traffic conditions appropriate for these missions. First, the 
well-clear volume used by the detection algorithm will be 
configured with threshold values appropriate for small UAS 
vehicles flying at low altitudes and speeds. Similarly, the 
maneuver guidance algorithms will be extended to support the 
flight dynamics of small rotorcraft and fixed-wing vehicles. In 
contrast to DAIDALUS, which assumes that a remote pilot will 
implement maneuver guidance to maintain or regain well-clear 
status, DAA maneuvers will be autonomously executed by 
ICAROUS. Therefore, ICAROUS includes a software module 
that selects a particular maneuver according to a user-defined 
optimization goal and fitness function. This optimized 
maneuver is checked against the mission-specific conformance 
criteria. 
A. Geofence Conformance  
Narkawicz and Hagen describe the mathematical 
foundations of the functions used to detect potential 
infringements of geofence boundaries in the constraint 
conformance algorithm [11]. These functions detect collisions 
between a linearly moving point, e.g. aircraft, and a (possibly 
moving) simple polyhedron generated by a 2 dimensional 
polygon and a pair of maximum/minimum altitudes. The 
collision detection algorithms have been formally verified in 
PVS to be mathematically correct under the assumption of 
bounded computer arithmetic errors. An implementation of 
these algorithms is used in a weather avoidance software 
module of the Stratway system [12]. This implementation will 
be integrated into ICAROUS for monitoring conformance to 
exclusionary (stay-off) or inclusionary  (stay-in) geofence 
boundaries.  
B. Obstacle Avoidance 
The current instantiation of ICAROUS assumes that the 
mission area is clear of unexpected obstacles such as trees, 
birds, people, and objects. However, the software architecture 
enables the extension of ICAROUS with obstacle sensing and 
avoidance algorithms, which will be made available in future 
instantiations of the system. A basic 2-D obstacle detection 
algorithm that uses the OpenCV open source library 
(http://opencv.org) is currently under development. 
C. Stand-off Distance  
ICAROUS stand-off distance function illustrated in Fig. 3, 
monitors and maintains a pre-established distance to a 
inspection mission target such as a power line. 
 
 
D. Return to Mission  
After any vehicle maneuver in response to either a well-
clear violation or a conformance criteria violation, ICAROUS 
will autonomously command the UAS vehicle to return to 
mission. This functionality will guarantee that mission goals 
are completed without gaps. For instance, in the case of a 
power line inspection, the return to mission functionality will 
command the vehicle to last inspected section of the power line 
prior to the avoidance maneuver. 
 
Fig. 3. Stand-off Distance Function 
1DAIDALUS is the DAA reference implementation included in SC228 
DAA MOPS, Appendix G. 
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If the vehicle deviates from the prescribed distance, 
ICAROUS generates a corrective maneuver to reestablish the 
appropriate stand-off distance. This functionality takes into 
account the dynamics and performance limits of the vehicle 
and other conformance criteria. The stand-off distance can be 
dynamically updated during flight, based on the needs and 
requirements of the mission. 
The ICAROUS software architecture is organized into 
several modules to facilitate its applicability across a wide 
range of missions. A data acquisition module accepts input 
data from multiple onboard navigation and sensor sources. A 
communication module implements all interaction with other 
onboard applications as well as ground control. A 
hierarchically organized, deterministic finite state machine in 
ICAROUS handles the core decision making and planning 
functionalities, monitors mission progress and triggers 
appropriate functions according to a their established priority in 
the hierarchy. Data transfer between ICAROUS, the onboard 
autopilot and other mission specific applications take place via 
a standardized communication protocol (MAVLink1). 
IV. FORMALLY VERIFIED ALGORITHMS IN AUTONOMOUS 
SYSTEMS 
Key to the ICAROUS design is the use of highly assured 
algorithms that support the development of safety-centric, 
autonomous UAS applications. These highly assured 
algorithms follow a formal development process that includes: 
 Formal specification of operational and functional 
requirements. 
 Formal verification that the functional requirements 
satisfy operational requirements. 
 Formal specification of functional models, i.e., 
algorithms.  
 Formal verification that functional models satisfy 
functional requirements. 
 Implementation of functional models as software 
modules. 
 Rigorous validation that software implementations and 
functional models coincide in a set of stressing cases.  
The PVS tool supports this formal development process. 
PVS (https://csl.pvs.sri.com) is a verification system developed 
by SRI International. It consists of a specification language to 
formally describe mathematical objects, such as algorithms and 
their properties, and a powerful interactive theorem prover. 
The theorem prover enables the mechanical verification of 
mathematical statements, such as the mathematical correctness 
of algorithms with respect to their specifications. The 
mathematical correctness property of an algorithm states that 
under well-specified assumption on the inputs of the algorithm, 
the algorithm always terminates in a state that satisfies a well-
specified assumption on the inputs and outputs of the 
algorithm. In particular, a formally verified algorithm in PVS 
always converges to a solution. These formal proofs provide a 
high level of assurance that the formal models of the 
algorithms and their software implementations are correct. 
A major challenge in the software verification of 
autonomous systems such as ICAROUS is that they frequently 
rely on highly complex, non-deterministic software modules 
that are not amenable to current verification techniques.  
ICAROUS design consists of a suite of highly assured, 
formally verified modules but it accommodates the 
incorporation of mission specific, user defined optimization 
techniques that may be required for certain applications. The 
notional graph in Fig. 4 shows the fundamental stages in the 
logic underlying the ICAROUS functions. The first stage in the 
process consists of a formally verified “Detector” function that 
identifies potentially unsafe conditions such as proximity to a 
geofence boundary or a predicted “well clear” violation with 
another aircraft. The second stage, the “Resolver”, generates 
ranges of safe maneuvers that, based on the performance 
limitations of the vehicle, can be executed to avoid the detected 
potentially unsafe condition. Both the detector and the resolver 
algorithms are formally verified and proven correct as shown 
in [13]. However, selection of the optimal maneuver from the 
provided maneuver ranges depends on the application or 
specific use of the software. The selection may be based on a 
mission-specific goal, computed with a sophisticated optimizer 
which cannot be formally verified.  The last stage in the 
process, the Correctness Criteria function, ensures the output 
conforms to the established criteria. Furthermore, the formally 
verified resolver guarantees that a non-optimized, but correct, 
maneuver always exists, in case the optimizer fails to converge 
to a solution.  
Fig.4. Formally Verified Algorithms for Assured Safety 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper presents a high-level description of the 
ICAROUS (Integrated Configurable Algorithms for Reliable 
Operations of Unmanned Systems) software architecture, 
which is being developed under NASA’s Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project. ICAROUS 
supports the modular development of safety-centric 
applications for small UAV autonomous missions. Key to the 
ICAROUS design is the use of highly assured algorithms that 
enable mission execution with autonomous, safety-based 
navigation and decision making while monitoring UTM 
procedures and mission-specific criteria. The set of ICAROUS 
algorithms includes detect and avoid, geofence conformance, 
stand-off distance monitoring, return to mission, and obstacle 
detection and avoidance. The rigorous formal development 
process used in ICAROUS and its highly configurable 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 MAVLink is a lightweight, message marshalling library for UAS applications. 
It is widely used by off-the-shelf autopilots such as PX4, Pixhawk, APM, and 
Parrot AR Drone platforms. 
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architecture enable the integration of unverified, mission 
specific software components.  The current instantiation of 
ICAROUS is being developed to support beyond visual-line-
of-sight autonomous power lines inspection missions. 
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